• “Modernizing Russia Project. Part II: Society’s View of Legal Protection in Russia”(with Denis Volkov and Stepan Goncharov), Center for European Policy Analysis, May 27, 2020.

    Over the last decade, Russia’s position in global rule-of-law rankings has continuously declined as the Kremlin used Russian law to crack down on its political opponents. Recent amendments to the Russian Constitution in 2020 further weakened the independence of the judicial system. Have the legal setbacks in Putin’s Russia undermined the prospects for a rules-based society? CEPA and the Levada Center sought to answer this question through a survey of Russians that was designed to explore how they view the legal situation in their country and what factors they consider to be key obstacles to the development of the rule of law. This report – the second in a series – focuses on Russians’ attitudes towards the rule of law situation in Russia.

  • “Modernizing Russia Project. Part I: Society’s View of Doing Business in Russia”(with Denis Volkov and Stepan Goncharov), Center for European Policy Analysis, April 13, 2020.

    Over the last decade, the Kremlin’s policies have consistently traded Russia’s economic development for Russia’s great power status. As a result, Russia has experienced a significant economic slowdown. Recent efforts to extend President Vladimir Putin’s presidency will enable Moscow to continue these policies. But are these policies feasible in the long term? Few in-depth empirical studies have attempted to answer this question. To do so, CEPA and the Levada Center ran a series of surveys in Russia designed to explore the modernizing trends within Russian society. This report – the first in a series – focuses on Russians’ attitudes towards business and entrepreneurship in Russia.

  • “Tension at the Top: The Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Poles of Power,” Center for European Policy Analysis, July 18, 2018.

    To what extent are Western sanctions on Russia impacting the Putin regime? Evidence suggests that economic sanctions are fostering a divide between (1) the groups that profit from Western money (Russia’s “oligarchs”), and (2) those who wield state power and/or profit from the domestic budget (Russia’ssiloviki). Two previous rounds of financial sanctions – credit freezes and the latest addition of several large companies to the U.S. Treasury’s list of “Specially Designated Nationals” (SDN) – appear to be straining the relationship between the oligarchs and the siloviki because of the strong impact these measures have on the Russian economy. For now, what is unclear is whether this tension at the top of Russian society will translate into a substantive policy change from the Kremlin.

  • “Will Russia’s “Digital Natives” Change Their Country’s Future?” Center for European Policy Analysis, April 5, 2018.

    The outcome of Russia’s 2018 “election” did not come as a surprise. In typical Kremlin fashion, the performance was realistically staged, with a few interesting plot twists, and the appearance of “choice.” One element that the Kremlin could not fully control, however, was the rise in grassroots opposition to the Kremlin’s political machine, particularly among Russia’s youth. What does this growing trend spell for the future of those in power in the Kremlin and how should the West view Russia’s rising generation?

  • “Reviving the Propaganda State: How the Kremlin Hijacked History to Survive,” Center for European Policy Analysis, January 17, 2018.

    Are Western actions to blame for the steady deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations? While the Kremlin’s view of the West has long been hostile, the spread of “color revolutions” in the early 2000s acted as a catalyst. Fearing a similar revolution at home, Putin’s “political technologists” worried that they lacked powerful stories, symbols, and the means to mobilize youth in support of the government. The Kremlin subsequently undertook a systematic effort to transform the country’s own history into a tool of the state. The retelling of Russian history—and the revival of potent anti-Western narratives—became an important component of the regime’s survival strategy. Parts of the old propaganda state were being reborn—with significant consequences for Moscow’s relations with the West.

  • “Is Putin’s Russia a Fascist Political System?” World Policy Journal, 34:1 (2017), 48-53.

    The political system created by Vladimir Putin in Russia is often described as fascist. I build on the existing scholarship on the topic to demonstrate that while Russia’s regime displays some important characteristics of a fascist political system, such as the embrace of a hypermasculine authority and state’s domination of all areas of society, it lacks others, such as Russia’s version of fascist ideology able to mobilize the country around a narrative of national rebirth.

  • “Policy Memo: Justifying a Counter-Cyclical US-Russia Policy (the Case of Energy Dependence),” the Harriman Institute, March 20, 2017.

    In this memo I argue that Russia’s behavior follows a typical pattern for petrostates: it tends to be more aggressive when oil prices peak. Hence, Russia is more likely to be assertive on the international stage when oil prices are high, and peaceful and cooperative when oil prices are low. This memo recommends a counter-cyclical policy with regards to Russia: containment when oil prices are high and cooperation when oil prices are low.

  • “Report: Stifling the Public Sphere: Media and Civil Society in Egypt, Russia, And Vietnam: Russia,” National Endowment for Democracy, 2015.

    In this report I identify three distinctive features of the Russian government’s system for media control. The first is a combination of selectivity and “strategic uncertainty” in the censorship regime, which offers a number of clear advantages over traditional mass repression. For example, it is less expensive to maintain, and it allows the regime to backtrack in case of overreach. The second feature is the authorities’ efforts to modify key narratives rather than trying to fully control them. Russia’s modern propaganda system has come to depend in part on the dissemination of falsehoods to sow confusion, especially beyond its borders. Finally, the authorities use a mix of economic pressure and arbitrary legal restrictions to cow or cripple
    domestic and international media outlets—as well as civil society groups—that threaten regime interests.

  • “Russia Report. Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine. Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare. Analytical Report,” the Institute for the Study of War, September 2015.

    Russia has been using an advanced form of hybrid warfare in Ukraine since early 2014 that relies heavily on an element of information warfare that the Russians call “reflexive control.”  Reflexive control causes a stronger adversary voluntarily to choose the actions most advantageous to Russian objectives by shaping the adversary’s perceptions of the situation decisively.  Moscow has used this technique skillfully to persuade the U.S. and its European allies to remain largely passive in the face of Russia’s efforts to disrupt and dismantle Ukraine through military and non-military means.